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Abstract 
Since the Islamic Revolution transformed Iran’s political system thirty years ago 
there have been significant violations of human rights including the right to life, the right 
to be free from torture, and other basic civil and political liberties. This essay examines 
the ebb and flow of human rights since the Revolution. Why has Iran consistently 
experienced a lack of political freedom and protection of human rights over the last thirty 
years and even during the Khatami presidency? Two reasons help explain this pattern: a 
specific and narrow interpretation of Islam and perceived domestic and international 
threats to the regime. Given the fact that human rights violations in Iran are less of a 
priority to many Western governments given the concern with Iran’s nuclear program, 
this essay explores possible approaches to seeing improvements in human rights via a 
modification of the spiral model.  
 
“We must bear in mind that in their attempt to take societies to a utopian future, free from 
any suffering, radical social and political projects tend to inflict great suffering on living 
individuals.”2  
 
I. Introduction 
 Assessing Iran’s human rights violations in the thirty years since the Islamic 
Revolution is a major undertaking. However, in these brief remarks it is worth recalling 
that despite the Shah’s rhetorical support for international human rights and the holding 
of a major conference in Tehran in 1968, the monarch in his 28 years on the Peacock 
throne had allowed numerous human rights violations to occur. The lack of democracy 
and free speech, as well as SAVAK’s brutal treatment of Iranians, is evidence of the fact 
that Iran had a poor record on human rights prior to the revolution. The Islamic 
Revolution did little to significantly improve Iran’s human rights record on many issues 
and there have been serious concerns raised both internally and externally about human 
rights violations over the last thirty years including the lack of personal and political 
freedoms.  
 Given the various concerns raised about human rights in Iran is there any reason 
to believe there will be an improvement in the protection of human rights in the future? 
Scholars such as Risse and Sikkink have suggested that states can be socialized to 
                                                        
1 Draft essay not for citation. Questions or comments are welcome and can be sent to flanagan@cwu.edu 
2 Akbar Ganji, The Road to Democracy in Iran, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 11 
 2 
improve at least part of their human rights record. They argue that western states, 
advocacy networks, and international norms can have a positive impact on rights of 
personal integrity in most if not all non-western developing countries.3 Will Iran be 
socialized to improve its human rights record? Is there any indication that international 
human rights norms have impacted Iran? This essay examines both the progress on and 
violations of human rights in Iran over the last thirty years. I want to explain why the 
Islamic regime has restricted the basic rights of its citizens, as well as what accounts for 
the progress made on some second generation rights.  To understand the progress and 
setbacks on human rights, this essay examines the limited impact of international human 
rights by using some aspects of the framework of the spiral model developed by Risse 
and Sikkink.  
This essay will expand the framework of the spiral model originally designed to 
study how norms, advocacy networks and western states can lead to improvements in 
personal integrity rights, in order to understand the status of a broad range of human 
rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Given Iran’s energy resources and the potential 
development of nuclear weapons, the spiral model with its focus on international norms 
and actors does not tell the entire story. To see further improvements in the protection of 
human rights this essay suggests that minimizing threats is also necessary to see further 
progress. Therefore, this essay examines Iran’s human rights record in the framework of 
the interplay of international human rights norms and perceived threats. 
The first part of this essay begins by examining the dynamics underlying human 
rights violations in Iran. What are the sources of human rights violations in Iran? I 
examine some of the specific violations of first generation human rights including the 
right to life and personal integrity, women’s political rights, and those civil and political 
rights necessary for meaningful political participation.4 This section explains the 
motivations and basis of the violations, specifically focusing on threats to the regime and 
the use of an interpretation of Islam. Then I investigate the condition of some socio-
                                                        
3 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into 
Domestic Practices: Introduction,” in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change, edited by Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 1.  
4 One cannot do justice to all of the civil and political rights articulated in the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights or even in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, so I have selected some specific 
civil and political rights that are representative of the situation of human rights in Iran.  
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economic human rights in Iran—specifically the second generation rights of education 
and health care.  
Part two of this essay examines how human rights can be improved in the future 
by laying out the theoretical framework for the socialization of human rights. Due to the 
elements at work in Iran, I modify the spiral model to incorporate needed elements to 
improve human rights in Iran. Although some may see the glass as half empty (there are 
still many basic civil and political rights that are not guaranteed), there are reasons to see 
a glimmer of hope. Iran’s protection of human rights in some areas is better than the 
Pahlavi regime (second generation human rights including health care and education) and 
better than some parts of the Middle East. Furthermore the discourse on human rights has 
changed over the last thirty years.  
II. Explaining Human Rights Violations in Iran 
Various individuals and international NGOs and IGOs have voiced concerns 
about human rights in Iran. Marking the 30th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, 
Amnesty International, issued a press release which expressed these concerns: 
Despite promises made by Ayatollah Khomeini that all Iranians would be free, the 
past 30 years has been characterized by persistent human rights violations. The 
vast scope and scale of those violations of the early years of the Islamic Republic 
did decline somewhat with time. Limited relaxation of restrictions on freedom of 
expression during the period of reform under former President Khatami raised 
hopes of a sustained improvement in the human rights situation, although the 
situation remained poor. However, these hopes have been firmly crushed since 
accession to power of President Ahmadinejad.  
 
Akbar Ganji, an Iranian journalist, also noted the extensive problems pertaining to first 
generation rights:  
We strongly oppose the current laws and policies in Iran, because they do not 
recognize freedom of thought, freedom of expression, or freedom of religion and 
assembly. We oppose them because they still sanction the death penalty for an 
infidel; because they imprison dissidents and those who live differently; because 
in the last eight years, they have closed more than a hundred magazines and 
newspapers. We oppose them because according to their version of Islamic law, 
they have allowed individuals to kill others deemed mahdour-al dam, or 
deserving of death. We oppose them because they have denied the citizens of Iran 
the right to determine their own fate. They deny the people the right to replace the 
current rulers in a peaceful manner. They have blocked all democratic methods of 
 4 
reform, and they have deprived our women of many of their civic and political 
rights.5  
 
Freedom House, with its focus on civil and political rights, has consistently rated 
the theocracy in Iran as Not Free with scores of 5, 6, and 7.6 The World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance indicators project also gives Iran low marks.7 Other 
organizations such as Human Rights Watch have criticized Tehran for its various 
violations of internationally recognized human rights codified in international law. Many 
in the west including the United States have repeatedly criticized the lack of human rights 
protections in Iran. The State Department issued is 2008 Human Rights Report on Iran in 
February 2009 and criticized a wide range of violations: 
The government severely limited citizen’s right to change their government 
peacefully through free and fair elections. The government executed numerous 
persons for criminal convictions as juveniles and after unfair trials. Security 
forces were implicated in custodial deaths and committed other acts of politically 
motivated violence, including torture. The government administered severe 
officially sanctioned punishments, including death by stoning, amputation, and 
flogging. Vigilante groups with ties to the government committed acts of 
violence…Authorities held political prisoners and intensified a crackdown against 
women's rights reformers, ethnic minority rights activists, student activists, and 
religious minorities. There was a lack of judicial independence and fair public 
trials. The government severely restricted civil liberties, including freedoms of 
speech, expression, assembly, association, movement, and privacy, and it placed 
severe restrictions on freedom of religion. Official corruption and a lack of 
government transparency persisted…. On December 18, for the sixth consecutive 
year, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution on Iran expressing 
"deep concern at ongoing systematic violations of human rights.8 
 
Most of these criticisms, elaborated on below, revolve around first generation rights and 
are related to perceived threats to the regime.   
 
 
                                                        
5 Pages 21-22 
6  In the 1980s (1980-1991) Iran consistently received scores of 5 and 6. The five years from 1992 to 1997 
saw a deterioration in rights according to Freedom House: 6 and 7. Between 1998 and 2007 the number has 
remained relatively stable at 6.  
7 Worldwide Governance indicators for 2009 (1996-2008). Percentile Rank: Voice and Accountability 8.2; 
Political Stability 14.4; Government Effectiveness 24.6; Regulatory Quality 2.9; Rule of Law 23.0; Control 
of Corruption 28.5; All of these statistics have deteriorated since 2003. infor.worldbank.org/governance. 
8 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119115.htm 
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The Right to Life and Personal Integrity in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
The early years after the revolution saw some of the gravest human rights 
violations committed against perceived threats to the regime and those considered not 
sufficiently loyal to Khomeini and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Besides purges of 
military officers and cabinet ministers, parliamentarians were executed because of their 
loyalty to the Shah and his un-Islamic policies. Robin Wright, a noted journalist, 
estimates that “almost six hundred Iranians faced the firing squad” between February 
1979 and November 1979.9  
 After many of the monarchists were imprisoned, executed, or fled to exile, the 
revolution turned on its own supporters. The Revolution’s diverse mix of secular 
intellectuals, Islamic clerics, and leftists were united in the initial goal of removing the 
shah. After this goal was accomplished a power struggle ensued between these three 
factions over what type of political system would develop and who would control this 
new government. 
 Many of the secular leaders/non-clerics expected and believed that the clerics 
would return to their religious seminaries. The Iranian political system would be Islamic 
(laws would not violate Shari’a) but the government would be run by lay individuals with 
technical experience. Bazargan, Iran’s first prime minister and Bani-Sadr Iran’s first 
president both thought that they could increase their power and direct the political 
system. Both ultimately failed. 
 Khomeini and his clerical supporters were unwilling to share power with secular 
elites and this threat to the power of the clerics would result in many violations of the 
right to life. In addition, komitehs (neighborhood committees) were created- often on an 
ad hoc basis- to protect the revolution from moral vice and a potential counterrevolution. 
These komitehs existed and acted as an alternative police force except that they were not 
controlled by the state. Prime Minister Bazargan complained, “The committees are 
everywhere and no one knows how many exist, not even the imam himself.”10 The 
komitehs’ crackdowns on un-Islamic behaviors did not sit well with many former 
revolutionaries, especially the leftists.  
                                                        
9 Robin Wright, In the Name of God, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 69 
10 Wright, 67-8 
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 The Mojahedin (MEK) fought back with a series of assassination attempts some 
of which were successful. On June 28, 1981 at an IRP (political party of the clerics) a 
bomb exploded killing over 70 leading IRP officials including Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Mohammad Beheshti. Additional bombs went off in Qom and Tehran. The bomb 
that went off in June, 1981 at Friday prayers in Tehran seriously injured Ali Khamenei.11  
In August an additional assassination claimed the lives of the new President Raja’i and 
Prime Minister Bahonar.  
 In response to these attacks, the government unleashed a reign of terror with 
numerous executions in the subsequent months. On September 19, 1981 149 people were 
executed. The following week saw more bloodshed with 110 people killed on one day.12 
These killings were implemented in part to protect the theocracy from a secular threat to 
the very existence of the regime. The reign of terror would come to an end in December 
1982 when Khomeini criticized “the government for deviating from Islamic behavior and 
exceeding their mandates.”13  
Torture 
 In addition to executions various individuals have been held in confinement and 
tortured while in jail. Accounts from opposition figures and dissidents tell of harsh 
treatment while in custody.14 Ahmad Batebi, a student protestor, who appeared on the 
cover of the Economist magazine in 1999, recalled how he was beaten and kicked in an 
interview after his escape and relocation to the United States. In addition to various 
humiliations and threats to his family, his treatment included sleep deprivation and being 
hung from the ceiling with his arms tied behind his back.15 The State Department’s 
annual report also detailed the torture of individuals in prison: 
Common methods of torture and abuse in prisons included prolonged solitary 
confinement with sensory deprivation, beatings, long confinement in contorted 
positions, kicking detainees with military boots, hanging detainees by the arms 
and legs, threats of execution, burning with cigarettes, sleep deprivation, and 
                                                        
11 Wright, 98 
12 Wright, 100-1 
13 Wright, 107 
14 Zarah Ghahramani with Robert Hillman, My Life as a Traitor, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2008); Marina Nemat, Prisoner of Tehran, (New York: Free Press, 2007).  
15 Scott Shane and Michael R Gordon, “Dissident’s Tale of Epic Escape from Iran’s Vise,” New York 
Times, July 13, 2008. www.nytimes.com/2008/07/13/world/middleeast/13dissident.html. See also Molavi, 
pages 206-7 
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severe and repeated beatings with cables or other instruments on the back and on 
the soles of the feet.16 
 
 Human Rights Watch reported in February 2009 that the head of the judiciary 
Ayatollah Shahroudi had acknowledged that four men had been tortured in detention: 
“The interrogators and prosecutors committed a serious negligent and careless acts in this 
case that lead to the abuse of the detainees’ words and writings in producing confession 
letters.”17 
In 2002 when the Reformists had control of parliament they attempted to pass a 
bill that would prohibit torture. However the Guardian Council rejected the bill arguing 
that the bill ‘was un-Islamic and unconstitutional’ and that torture may be necessary ‘in 
some exceptional circumstances.’18 This contradicts Article 38 of the constitution, which 
states, “all forms of torture for the purpose of extracting confession or acquiring 
information are forbidden.” 
Political Rights 
Freedom of Expression   
 Freedom of speech or the ability to freely discuss ideas without fear of criminal 
prosecution is not a right that is protected or guaranteed in Iran despite claims to the 
contrary by political leaders.19 Freedom of speech (article 26) is limited within an Islamic 
context. Thus Iranian citizens have freedom of thought and expression within the bounds 
of Islam. This limitation has been employed against many individuals who criticize the 
government.  Political views that are critical of members of the ruling elite or question 
the role of religion in the political system have been censored and individuals voicing 
political dissent have been arrested and thrown in jail. 
                                                        
16 One might also note that many of these complaints have also been directed towards the United States 
with regard to their treatment of detainees at Gitmo as noted by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross.  
17 Human Rights Watch, “Iran: Four Journalists Sentence to Prison, Floggings,” 2/10/09. 
www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/02/10/iran-four-journalists-sentenced-prison-floggings?... 
18 Ali Ansari, Confronting Iran, (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 207. 
19 In September 2008 President Ahmadinejad in an interview with the New York Times said, “Iran is a free 
country for people to express their opinions…Mr. Rohani (who has criticized the president’s oil policy) is a 
free person in Iran who is free to express his views. Everyone is free to express what he or she wants 
whether for or against the government and there are in fact hundreds of opinions that in fact speak in favor 
of out policies.” The interview can be found at www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/world/middleeast/26iran-
transcript.html?ref=world&... 
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In the aftermath of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini and other religious 
revolutionaries tolerated very little dissent or criticism. Their distrust for some of their 
revolutionary companions especially leftists and secular elites who were not considered 
loyal to the regime led to purges, repression, detention and execution.20 This was also an 
attempt by the new government tried to rid the country of western influence. Khomeini 
was fearful of the influence of western and un-Islamic ideas. In Islamic Government, he 
outlined these fears: 
Although all things contrary to the Shari’a must be forbidden, emphasis has been 
placed on sinful talk and consumption of what is forbidden, implying that these 
two evils are more dangerous than all others and must therefore be more 
diligently combated. Sometimes the statements and propaganda put forth by 
oppressive regimes are more harmful to Islam and the Muslims than their actions 
and policy….21 
 Other outspoken critics of the repressive nature of the Iranian regime have 
repeatedly been harassed. Abdolkarim Soroush, an influential intellectual had been fired 
from various university positions, physically threatened, and prohibited from teaching 
and travelling outside of the country.22 Iran’s leadership feared the power of Soroush’s 
ideas. Soroush is threatening to the clerical regime because he has proposed an alternative 
interpretation of Islam. He believes that while the texts of holy books such as the Bible or 
the Quran do not change our understanding of them may change. So we can always 
reinterpret a religious text: 
 Nothing is sacred in human society. All of us are fallible human beings. Though 
 religion itself is sacred, its interpretation is not sacred and therefore it can be 
 criticized, modified, refined and redefined.23  
 
The notion that religious texts can be reinterpreted does not sit well with many of the 
clerical elites. This has led Soroush to argue for Islamic democracy: 
 I give two bases for Islamic democracy. The first pillar is this: In order to be a 
 true believer, one must be free. To become a believer under pressure or coercion 
 wont be true belief…Thus freedom is the basis of democracy.24 
                                                        
20 John Esposito and John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 66. Bani-
Sadr who advised Khomeini in exile, fled to Paris. 
21 Khomeini, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Iman Khomeini, translated and annotated 
by Hamid Algar, (Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1981), 113 
22 Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri, “Introduction” in Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: 
Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), xi.  
23 Quoted in Robin Wright, The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran, (New York: 
Knopf, 2000), 42 
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Akbar Ganji, a journalist who served in the Revolutionary Guard and supported 
the revolution, was jailed for six years for his writings. His exposure of corruption 
(including family members of Rafsanjani) and a series of high profile murders as well as 
his passionate defense of human rights landed him in solitary confinement in Evin 
Prison.25 Human rights are also mutable according to Ganji and this poses a direct 
challenge to some of the religious doctrine argued by religious leaders. Some clerics in 
Iran confine religion to Islamic laws which they view as unchanging and infallible. In 
contrast Ganji argues: 
The concept of human rights remains open to change: new rights might develop, 
or old rights might lose their relevance. This mutability has two sources: as 
humans gain more knowledge about their condition, their self-perception evolves 
and expands. New understandings of causes of suffering may emerge and require 
new rights. In addition, as life become more developed and more complex, new 
problems arise.26 
 
Ganji’s words are threatening to some political elites which is why they have tired to 
silence him. Very few can openly criticize the president without fear of criminal 
prosecution or harassment.27 On December 21st, the police confronted Nobel Laureate 
Shirin Ebadi, entered the office of the Defenders of Human Rights Center (DHRC) which 
she founded and confiscated cameras and shut down the office. Human Rights Watch’s 
Executive Director criticized the raid as an attempt by the government to intimidate 
human rights defenders throughout the country: 
The closure of DHRC is not just an attack on Shirin Ebadi and her Iranian 
colleagues, but on the entire international human rights community of which she 
is an influential and important member.28 
                                                                                                                                                                     
24 Quoted in Wright, The Last Great Revolution,  page 41.  
25 Akbar Ganji, The Road to Democracy in Iran, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008) xvii. Ganji’s defense 
of human rights is based on the capacity for suffering: “The common experience of pain is thus the 
foundation for human rights. We believe that any human being who has the capacity to suffer is entitled to 
certain rights…Supporters of universal rights, including signatories to the International Declaration of 
Human Rights, believe that human beings suffer from common sources, and that we must find ways to 
spare people these experiences.” See pages 6-7 
26 Ganji, 7 
27 One of the few individuals to criticize Ahmadinejad in an open and direct manner is former President 
Khatami who in December 2007 criticized the president’s economic policy and crackdown on political 
activists. Nazila Fathi, “Former Iranian President Publicly Assails Ahmadinejad,” New York Times, 
12/12/07 www.nytimes.com/2007/12/12/world/middleeast/12iran.html. 
28 Human Rights Watch, press release, December 21, 2008. “Iran: Reverse Closure of Nobel Laureate’s 
Rights Group.” www.hrw.org. See also “Iranian Police Shut Down Rights Office,” December 22, 2008, 
www.nytimes.com/2008/12/22/world/middleeast/22tehran.html. 
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There have been other high profile denials of freedom of expression, the most famous 
concerning Salman Rushie. It was on February 14, 1989 that Supreme Leader Khomeini 
issue a fatwa because The Satanic Verses was deemed an affront to Islam due to its 
description of the prophet.  The fatwa demanded a response for this insult to Islam:  
In the name of God Almighty; there is only one God, to whom we shall all return; 
I would like to inform all the intrepid Muslims in the world that the author of the 
book entitled The Satanic Verses which has been complied, printed and published 
in opposition to Islam, the Prophet and the Qur’an, as well as those publishers 
who were aware of its contents, have been sentenced to death. I call on all zealous 
Muslims to execute them quickly, wherever they find them, so that no one will 
dare to insult the Islamic sanctions. Whoever is killed on this path will be 
regarded as a martyr, godwilling.29  
This call for the execution of Rushdie and the denial of free speech that accompanies this 
intimidation and threat was met with condemnation from many in the West. 
University students who have protested against government policies have also 
encountered many difficulties and have often ended up in Evin Prison in Tehran. The 
judiciary’s closure of the daily newspaper, Salam- a pro-Khatami, reformist paper- led to 
student protests in the summer of 1999. The protestors were met by Ansar-e-Hezbollah 
and many students were beaten. Some were killed in these confrontations.30    
Student protests at Shiraz University in the early months of 2008 also resulted in a 
harsh crack down with many arrests. More recently students at the Amir Kabir University 
in Tehran who protested the lack of academic freedom and the burial of war veterans 
from the Iran-Iraq War on campus grounds were arrested. 31 
 We can link the silencing of political dissent to domestic pressure and foreign 
pressure. Threats from abroad have increased the insecurity of the political elite: 
 At the same time, the Bush Administration’s efforts to promote democracy and 
 threats of military action against Iran- made more vivid by the presence of tens of 
 thousands of American troops in neighboring countries- have given Tehran’s 
                                                        
29 Mehdi Mozaffari (1995), “Rushdie Affair” in John L. Esposito, ed., The Oxford Encyclopedia of the 
Modern Islamic World, (New York: Oxford University Press), 443. 
30 Molavi, The Soul of Iran, (New York: Norton, 2002), 201-2. 
31 Human Rights Watch, “Iran: Release Students Detained for Peaceful Protests,” 2/24/09. www.hrw.org. 
See also BBC, “Arrests after Protest in Tehran,” news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/7907276.stm. 
Amnesty International, “Iran’s Presidential Election Amid Unrest and Ongoing Human Rights Violations,” 
June 5, 2009. www.amnesty.org 
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 hardliners a pretext to silence dissent and reverse political and social freedoms 
 secured during the Khatami era.32 
 
Presidential Elections in 2009 
The large scale protests that followed the interior ministry’s declaration that 
President Ahmadinejad had been re-elected a few hours after the polls closed, was one of 
the most significant domestic threats to the clerical regime. The millions of protestors 
who came out in the streets day after day signalled a loss of legitimacy and a political 
challenge to the regime.  The Supreme Leader attempted to end the demonstrations when 
on June 19th, 2009 at Friday Prayers he order a halt to the protests. His chilling threat that 
opposition leaders would be responsible for the bloodshed and chaos that followed left no 
doubt that he was willing to use force to deal with this threat.33 Ironically in this same 
speech he also used the language of human rights by defending democracy and the rule of 
law. He said “The Islamic State would not cheat and betray the vote of the people.”34 He 
further suggested that protestors use proper legal avenues to lodge their complaints.  
When protestors took to the streets the day after Friday Prayers, albeit in smaller 
numbers, they were directly challenging the Supreme Leader. Furthermore there have 
been hundreds of people arrested including journalists, intellectuals, students, opposition 
leaders, and reformists. At least 30 people were killed although some suspect the number 
is much higher. The government has also tried to limit access to the internet as well as 
social networking sites such as Facebook.  
The threats to the regime were material and ideological. If Mousavi and reform 
minded politicians were able to gain power they may agree to talk to or compromise with 
the United States which would challenge one of the central tenets of the Islamic 
Revolution of 1979. It could also have a financial impact if certain ministries were no 
longer controlled by hardliners. This was, in many ways, a similar response to election of 
former President Khatami. Khatami, unlike some of the more militant clerics, spoke 
                                                        
32 Karim Sadjadpour, “Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran’s Most Powerful Leader,” 
(Washington., D.C. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 2. 
33 Nazila Fathi and Alan Cowell, “Iran’s Ruling Cleric Warns of Bloodshed if Protests Persist,” New York 
Times, 6/20/09 www.nytimes.com/2009/06/20/world/middleeast/20iran.html?hp=&pa... Also look up 
Supreme Leader’s Webpage and his sermon at Friday prayers.  
34 Nazila Fathi and Alan Cowell, “Iran’s Ruling Cleric Warns of Bloodshed if Protests Persist,” New York 
Times, 6/20/09 www.nytimes.com/2009/06/20/world/middleeast/20iran.html?hp=&pa 
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favorably about encouraging human rights in Iran. He wanted to promote a greater 
democratization of the Iranian political system. He also encouraged more cultural 
freedoms and freedom of the press.35 However, many of the reformists’ efforts were 
blocked by the conservatives on the Guardian Council, Judiciary, and other aspects of the 
government. This was due to the fact that reformers were perceived to be a threat to the 
power of some of the hard-line conservatives. Thus the regime’s response to the elections 
in 2009, echoing the Khatami years, demonstrated how the regime when faced with a 
perceived domestic threat to their political security would respond in a harsh manner. 
In sum, we can also see many human rights violations occurring as a result of 
perceived threats to those who control the levers of power. Whether that was a foreign 
threat, (for example, the Iran-Iraq War 1980-88) or a domestic threat (reformist) Tehran 
often responded with crackdowns and repression at home. Additional violations of human 
rights have been a result of Khomeini’s interpretation of Islamic concepts and values. 
Women’s Civil and Political Rights 
 The position of women in Iranian society since the revolution has fluctuated with 
the political winds in Iran. While Iranian women have far greater rights and opportunities 
than their counterparts in, for example, Saudi Arabia, they do not enjoy complete 
equality. The mixed and inconsistent messages women have received from the regime are 
a product of the factional politics (reformers vs. hard line conservatives) and of the 
evolution of Khomeini’s Islamic thinking on the subject. His views have been employed 
by various political forces for granting women more rights as well as expecting women to 
uphold their traditional roles within the family.  
 In the early 1960s Khomeini in his criticism of the Shah’s efforts at reform 
specifically aimed at the policies concerning women: 
The court of the oppressor (illegitimate ruler) wants to give equal rights to women 
and men, and trample on the precepts of the Qur’an and the Shari’a, and to take 
18 year old girls into compulsory military service.36 
 
Thus, in the 1960s Khomeini, based on his interpretation of Islam, did not articulate equal 
political rights for women. He would however encourage women’s political participation 
                                                        
35 Ali Ansari, Confronting Iran, (New York: Basic Books, 2006) 158.  
36 Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran, (New York: I. B. 
Tauris, 2000), 61 
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in the revolution and the political process thereafter. In 1978, Khomeini offered a 
different vision for women: “In the Islamic system a woman is a human being who can be 
equally active as a man in the building of a new society.”37  And a few months later in 
March of 1979 he praised the political involvement of women during the revolution: 
One of the blessings of this movement is that women have become involved in the 
matters of the day and in political matters…Now all the people, whether women 
or men, are involved in the destiny of their country.”38 
 
While Khomeini did not argue for full equality in terms of political participation (women 
are not able to become Supreme Leader and have been rejected by the Guardian Council 
as candidates for president) he did offer women a limited space in the political realm, far 
greater than in some other countries in the Middle East. Despite some political rights, 
Iranian women have not enjoyed the same status as men and in many respects are second 
class citizens in the Islamic Republic. Ganji has referred to the situation of Iranian 
women as ‘gender apartheid.”39 While the constitution guarantees the equal rights of 
women in Articles 3 and 20, there are also limiting clauses. Article 20 places this within 
the criteria of Islam: 
 All citizens of the country, both men and women, equally enjoy the protection of 
 the law and enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, in 
 conformity with Islamic criteria.  
 
When the revolution occurred in 1979 many women participated not only in street 
demonstrations but also in the referendum on Iran’s political system. Since 1979 women 
have been encouraged- at times forced- to play the traditional role of nurturing mother 
and dutiful wife.40 Women who were judges prior to the revolution were replaced by men 
and some women were dissuaded from practicing law.41 Women are also segregated in 
many public places including in classrooms, and have been prohibited from attending 
                                                        
37 Martin, 155 
38 Martin, 156 
39 Ganji, 33 
40 Azar Nafisi, Reading Lolita in Tehran, (New York: Random House, 2003). See also Mahmood 
Monshipouri, Islamism, Secularism, and Human Rights in the Middle East, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1998), 188. The legal age for girls to marry was raised from 9 to 13 Rebecca Barlow and 
Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Prospects for Feminism in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Human Rights Quarterly 
30 (2008), 21-40 at 27. 
41 Valentine M. Moghadam, “Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: Towards a Resolution of the Debate,” 
Signs, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Summer, 2002), pp. 1135-1171. 
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sporting events.42 Women in Iran do not enjoy equal treatment or equal status with their 
male counterparts. According to Rebecca Barlow and Shahram Akbarzadeh, this stems 
from ‘a culture of patriarchy’ and the fundamental belief of many of Iran’s conservative 
elite that “women are inferior to men in terms of rationality and their ability to live 
autonomous lives.”43 This inequality is translated into various laws and practices 
including the fact that a woman’s testimony in a court of law is “valued at half that of a 
man’s.”44 
In addition, women do not have the basic freedom to choose their attire.  The veil 
is mandatory for all women regardless of their religious beliefs in public. Women are 
mandated to have her head covered because it was a means to protect her chastity and 
purity. As Ayatollah Khamenei noted, “any hijab removal would lead to the removal of 
chastity from society and the destruction of the family.”45 Women who do not wear their 
veil properly (their veil does not cover their hair) can be brought into police custody and 
fined by the authorities. There have been various crackdowns on women who do not 
completely cover their hair.46  
 Some Iranian women have been brave enough to confront what they view as their 
second class citizenship status in Iran. The response from the government has often been 
violent and harsh. “In response to peaceful demonstrations by women’s rights advocates 
challenging discriminatory laws (including stoning for adultery) security forces arrested 
numerous women. Five women were charged with acting against national security by 
participating in an illegal gathering even though Article 27 of the Iranian Constitution 
and Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes the 
                                                        
42 In June of 2005 hundreds of women demonstrated against the gender discrimination that exist in Iran. 
Nazila Fathi, “Hundreds of Women Protest Sex Discrimination in Iran,” New York Times, 12 June 2005. 
www.nytimes.com/2005/06/12/international/middleast/13womencnd.html?ei=5094... Some women have 
also complained of the practice of temporary marriage. A temporary marriage is “a religiously sanctioned 
marriage with contractual obligations but for a finite period of time.” (Nasr, 69) 
43 “Prospects for Feminism in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Human Rights Quarterly 30 (2008), 21-40 at 
23.  
44 Ibid., 23. Monshipouri, 189.  
45 “Nation Must Develop Insight Prior to Ballot,” 1/23/08 www.leader.ir/langs/EN/print.php?id=3816. 
Women during the Pahlavi monarchy were courageous and stood up to the shah’s pressures to remove the 
hijab. The hijab covers the head and the neck. Some Iranians women wear a chador which is a cloak that 
covers the entire body. A burka covers not only the entire body but a woman’s face as well. 
46 Foreign journalists have noted the limited effects of these government actions. BBC, “New Iranian dress 
code crackdown,” 6/17/2008, news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/7457212.stm.  
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right to peaceful assembly.”47 Some of the peaceful protesters were also beaten before 
being taken to Evin Prison.  
Additional peaceful protests have also encountered a heavy handed response from 
the Iranian authorities. In March of 2006 several women who were part of the One 
Million Signatures Campaign were arrested and later convicted of ‘acting against national 
security, disrupting public order, and refusing to follow police orders.’ Nasrin Afzali, 
Nahid Jafari, and Minoo Mortazi were given suspended sentences of lashings and prison 
time.48 The sentences will not be carried out unless the women commit additional crimes. 
However, one of the defense lawyers, Zahra Arzani, has suggested that the suspended 
sentences were an effort to limit human rights activists in Iran. The One Million 
Signatures Campaign is a campaign to end gender discrimination in Iranian laws 
especially in the area of family law.49  Efforts by the campaign to ratify CEDAW have 
not been successful. The Guardian Council refused to approve CEDAW arguing that it 
was unconstitutional and un-Islamic.   
In sum, we see that perceived threats to the regime (secular types, MEK) and 
violations against Khomeini’s interpretation of Islam explain many of the human rights 
violations in Iran. Despite the various violations of human rights in the Islamic theocracy, 
we have also seen some limited improvements in a few second generation rights. 
III. Progress on Human Rights 
Basic Needs and Health Care 
 In the thirty years since the revolution we have seen some significant 
improvements in second generation rights although this has received far less attention 
from scholars discussing human rights. There has been a significant improvement by the 
government in providing for the basic needs of its citizens. This commitment to 
improving the lives of the poor can be linked to the goals and rhetoric of the revolution in 
                                                        
47 Those charged were Nusheen Ahmadi Khorasani; Parvin Ardalan; Sussan Tahmasebi; Shahla Entesari, 
and Fariba Davoodi Mohayer. Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan, “Improving Democracy in Religious Nation-
States: Norms of Moderation and Cooperation in Ireland and Iran,” Muslim World Journal of Human 
Rights, Volume 4, Issue 2, (2007). Human Rights Watch, “Iran: Women on Trial for Peaceful 
Demonstration: Activists Arrested for Protesting Discriminatory Laws,” February 27, 2007. Kasra Naji, 
Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran’s Radical Leader, (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 
2008), 252. 
48 Payvand, “Iran: Women’s Rights Activists Get Suspended Lashing Sentences,” 4/24/08 
49 Ibid. 
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1979 when Khomeini promised to help the oppressed. Furthermore it is not viewed as 
threatening to the ruling elite. 
 Since the revolution Iran has reduced poverty. In the 1990s poverty had decreased 
from 26% to 21%.50 Less than 4% of Iranians fall below the poverty line ($1 per day). 
This number is more significant in comparison to a state such as India where 25% of the 
population is below the poverty line.51 Furthermore, access to electricity and piped water 
in rural areas increased substantially since the revolution. Access to electricity was below 
20% in 1977 and by 2004 it was over 95%. Similar improvements can be seen with 
access to water.52 
 Iran has continued to invest in its health services and the results are encouraging. 
In the 15 year period from 1991 to 2006 Iran has increased the social service complexes 
in urban areas (from 414-980) and in rural areas (1121-1495). These complexes assist 
Iranians with their health care needs as well as providing orphanages and day care 
centers.53 There has also been increased access to medical services. One result has been 
the decline in child mortality rates.54 These results have been possible because of 
government support, including increased female literacy. It has been estimated that the 
government is spending close to $2 billion on subsidies for food and medicine. 
Furthermore various charities which receive government funding also provide direct 
assistance to over two million Iranians.55 In addition, there has been greater access to 
birth control. In the late 1980s, the government developed a policy called The National 
Birth Control Policy, which “provided free contraceptives (to married couples) through 
the primary health care system.”56 This policy was developed to help with family 
planning and encourage women to have fewer children. 
 
                                                        
50 World Bank, “Poverty in Iran: Trends and Structure, 1986-1998,” Middle East and North Africa Region, 
Washington, D.C. 
51 Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, “Oil Wealth and Economic Growth in Iran,” in Contemporary Iran: Economy, 
Society, Politics, edited by Ali Gheissari, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 16 
52 Electricity: 16.2% (1977) to 98.3% (2004); Piped Water: 11.7% (1977) to 89.0% (2004). Statistical 
Center of Iran, 1984-2005 Household Income and Expenditure Surveys. 
53 Iran Statistical Yearbook 1385 (2006-7) www.sci.org.ir 
54  In 1960 there were 281 deaths per 1,000 births versus 42 deaths per 1,000 births in 2001. World Bank, 
“World Development Indicators,” 2003, Washington, D.C. 
55 Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, page 15. 
56 Pardis Mahdavi, “Who Will Catch Me If I Fall? Health and the Infrastructure of Risk for Urban Young 
Iranians,” in Ali Gheissari edition, at page 165.  
 17 
Improvements in Education 
 In addition to the improvements in access to health care, women have also 
enjoyed access to the education system. Women have used these opportunities to further 
their abilities and this has been demonstrated in a number of areas. Literacy rates have 
improved dramatically since the revolution. For example, between 1976 and 1996 
women’s literacy doubled (1976- 36% of Iranian women were considered literate and by 
1996 the figure rose to 72%). By 2006, the literacy rates for girls ten years and older was 
80%.57 Some have suggested that the segregation of gender helped socially conservative 
families allow their daughters to go to school. That some of the classes were offered in 
mosques furthered female literacy.58 Furthermore, by 2000, more women than men were 
studying at institutions of higher education.59 The human rights lawyer and Noble prize 
winner, Shirin Ebadi noted that close to 65% of the students in universities were 
women.60  
 These improvements helped Iranian women in the labor market as well. In the last 
thirty years women’s participation in the workforce has increased (although there were 
some women who lost their jobs in the immediate aftermath of the revolution). This 
increase in the female workforce has not been limited to cheap jobs in manufacturing. 
Rather women have been increasingly moving into the service sector. In 1976, women 
made up 38.2% of the manufacturing force, 39.5% of education, health care and social 
services, and 18.3% in social, personal and financial services. By 2006, women in 
manufacturing had declined to 18.7%, while education, health care, and social services 
had increased to 48.6% and in the social, personal and financial services it was up to 
28.2%.61 This shows that women are moving into higher paying jobs.62 
Women’s Political Rights 
 Despite some discriminatory practices enshrined in the legal system, women do 
enjoy some political rights in Iran. Since the revolution women have been given the right 
                                                        
57 Statistical Center of Iran, www.sci.org 
58 Roksana Bahramitash and Hadi Salehi Esfahani, “Nimble Fingers No Longer! Women’s Employment in 
Iran,” in Ali Gheissari edition, at page 92.  
59 Jane Howard, Inside Iran: Women’s Lives, (Washington, D.C.: Mage Publishers, 2002), 85, 79.  
60 Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 24. 
61 Statistical Center of Iran. 
62 As Bahramitash and Saleshi Esfahani note this is contrary to the female workforce in other parts of the 
global south. “The trend has been the opposite: women have increasingly left nimble-finger jobs in the 
carpet industry to go to school so as to take on clerical, technical and professional positions.” Page 79.  
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to vote and have participated in every election in the last thirty years. In the June 2009 
Presidential Election women were active in the campaign including Mousavi’s wife, 
Zahra Rahnavard, who campaigned with her husband and energized the women’s vote. In 
response, some of the candidates promised to address women’s rights. A few women 
have even been elected to the Majlis and have participated in the governance of the 
country, although they “did not succeed in producing substantive and lasting changes to 
the status of women in Iranian society.”63 However, Iran has more female members 
elected to Parliament than some other countries in the Middle East.  
Some Iranians have even suggested that Iran’s treatment of women should be a 
model for other Muslim countries- going so far as to suggest that Iran is more progressive 
than other countries because women can vote, drive and hold positions within the 
government.64  When examining the issues of birth control and women’s education we 
see that neither is viewed as a threat to the political elites. Ultimately, while women enjoy 
some rights and some limited progress has been made, women do not enjoy full equality 
in many areas.  
In sum, we can explain the lack of political freedom and personal integrity rights 
stem from perceived domestic and international threats to the regime and a specific and 
narrow interpretation of Islam. The role of threats can also explain the improvement on 
some second generation rights. The progress we see in the areas of health care and 
education are available because they can be seen as non-threatening to the regime. 
Therefore beyond a commitment to Islamic purity, the self-interest of political leaders in 
Tehran and their desire to remain in control of the levers of power can explain many of 
the human rights violations in Iran over the last thirty years. Having examined the 
progress and limitations on human rights in Iran, I now turn to the spiral model developed 
by Risse and Sikkink to explore the role of norms and discourse for the future of human 
rights in Iran.  
 
 
 
                                                        
63 Barlow and Akbarzadeh, 28.  
64 Hassan Hanizadeh, “Women’s Rights in Iran,” Tehran Times, 7/08/07. 
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IV. Socialization of International Human Rights 
Norms 
 For decades scholars have discussed the value and broad appeal of human 
rights.65 Richard Rorty has discussed the elevated status of human rights: 
 Some have argued that a human rights culture is persuasive throughout the world. 
 This human rights culture refers to the fact that human rights have reached iconic 
 status in modern culture such that the belief in human rights, at least in the 
 importance of the concept, is near universal.66   
 
Beyond the question of the importance or universality of human rights lies the more 
pragmatic question: how does a state evolve from a flagrant abuser of human rights to 
one where the rule of law protects the basic human rights of its citizens? Risse and 
Sikkink have offered a way to get from here (violation of rights) to there (protection of 
human rights). They offer a five phase spiral model as a process by which international 
human rights norms concerning personal integrity rights are socialized and ultimately 
protected.67 They argue that western states and advocacy networks can pressure states to 
improve their protection of human rights. 
 The first phase of the model involves the repression by the government and the 
initial activity of a transnational network. Domestic opposition groups are impotent to 
confront the government at this stage. In the next phase, there is more international 
activity on behalf of the victims. International NGOs raise awareness about the human 
rights situation in the country.  Human rights organizations in the state complain about 
the violations at the same time international organizations are openly criticizing the state 
and trying to get western states to put pressure on the government. The government 
typically denies the charges: 
                                                        
65 “The idea of international human rights has proved broadly appealing. Even those like Stalin, who denied 
most human rights in practice, wrote liberal constitutions and organized elections so as to pretend to 
recognize human rights.” David Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, 2nd edition, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), page 11. See also Richard Falk, Achieving Human Rights, 
(New York: Routledge, 2008). “In these contexts the language and pursuit of rights provides a moral 
motivation for initiatives that aim both to resist oppressive moves emanating from the established order and 
to transform the status quo in accord with goals associated with equity, equality and human solidarity.” 
Page 27. Despite the broad appeal of human rights, many governments have not found it appealing to 
protect the human rights of its citizens.   
66 Richard Rorty, “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality,” in The Philosophy of Human Rights, 
ed. Patrick Hayden, (St Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2001), pages 241-257 at 245. 
67 The description of the five phase spiral model can be found on pages 22-35. 
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 ‘Denial’ means that the norm violating government refuses to accept the validity 
 of international norms themselves and it opposes the suggestion that its national 
 practices in this area are subject to international jurisdiction. Thus, denial goes 
 further than simply objecting to particular accusations. The norm-violating 
 government charges that the criticism constitutes an illegitimate intervention in 
 the internal affairs of the country. The government may even succeed in 
 mobilizing some nationalist sentiment against foreign intervention and criticism.68   
 
After denying the validity of international human rights, in the third phase of the 
model, the targeted state will offer tactical concessions. The state will try to pacify 
international and domestic criticism with a few minor, cosmetic changes. Thus the regime 
begins to ‘talk the talk’ and uses the language of human rights. There may be further 
limited acts such as releasing prisoners or allowing some additional limited press 
freedoms. Risse and Sikkink note that at times the regime can become ‘entrapped’ by 
their own rhetoric when it is later used against them. 
The fourth phase is the prescriptive phase or the stage at which despite continuing 
human rights violations the regime is regularly invoking human rights norms- thus the 
norms are no longer controversial.69 These norms concerning international human rights 
are accepted by the regime as legitimate. At this stage the government may sign 
international human rights conventions or establish institutions to protect human rights. 
The last phase occurs when international human rights have become 
institutionalized and habitual through the rule of law. International human rights are no 
longer controversial instead they are regularly protected within the domestic political 
system. Risse and Sikkink do allow that their model of norms and socialization will not 
work with all states: “The less dependent national governments are on the outside world- 
in terms of both material and ideational resources- the less they should be concerned.”70 
In sum, we see that the spiral model is important because it shows how international 
norms and pressure from Western actors can influence non-Western states. The model 
also acknowledges that for states that are more independent of the Western community 
the model will not be as effective. It is in the context of norms, ideas and socialization 
that this essay seeks to examine additional progress on human rights in Iran by modifying 
the spiral model. 
                                                        
68 Risse and Sikkink, page 23. 
69 Page 29. 
70 Page 34.  
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V Adjusting the Model: Threats 
Given the source of human rights violations and the limited improvements in 
some human rights in Iran, the spiral model is inadequate in its formation to deal with the 
situation in Iran. Since threats, perceived and real, are central to understanding the human 
rights violations in Iran, the role of threats must be incorporated into any model that seeks 
to explain progress on human rights. Additionally, Risse and Sikkink note that states that 
are less dependent on the West will be less sensitive to pressure from Western states and 
NGOs. While Iran is not entirely independent of the West due to its dependence on oil 
(and the need to see it in foreign markets not to mention the issue of refinement), the 
Islamic Republic has managed to survive thirty years worth of sanctions. Thus under the 
model previously discussed international pressure from NGOs and western states would 
only have some limited impact.71 Thus limited changes must be made to the spiral model 
to incorporate some features unique to Iran.72 In light of this I seek to add to the model 
the notion of threat perception. Namely that in addition to international norms a 
diminishing level of threats from the international community and the United States in 
particular is necessary if we are to see improvement in the protection of human rights and 
the eventual institutionalization of human rights in Iran. 
Modification to the Spiral Model: 
Phase 1  Phase 2  Phase 3  Phase 4  Phase 5  Phase 6 
 
Repression Denial  Threat  Tactical   Prescriptive Rule 
    Reduction Concessions Status  Consistent 
      & Negotiated & Domestic Behavior 
      Transition Pressure on  
        Islam 
 
While the early phases of the spiral model remain applicable to Iran, the third 
phase of the process removes external threats. Decreasing threats (and perceived threats) 
from abroad, specifically foreign countries can provide the space for the gradual 
                                                        
71 Note criticisms of Iran by various international NGOs discussed earlier in the paper. 
72 It is also worth noting that none of the countries discussed in The Power of Human Rights were oil 
producing states that were also making progress on the nuclear front. 
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improvement of human rights. Risse and Sikkink suggest that international pressure 
(Western states and NGOs) and potential sanctions can push a targeted state on the road 
to socialization and institutionalization of international human rights. However in Iran’s 
case, thirty years of sanctions have defused some of the pressure at work in the spiral 
model. Over the last thirty years various attempts to pressure Tehran have been viewed as 
threats from Western states, especially the United States.73 This is why there is a need for 
threat reduction. Reducing the threats prevents a rally around the flag effect from political 
elites. In Iran’s case removing threats would include avoiding any rhetoric about regime 
change and discouraging the threat from Israel.74 President Obama’s efforts to reach out 
to Iran and negotiate are steps in this direction. Further international cooperation on the 
nuclear issue including economic incentives would be helpful. Threat reduction can 
provide the opening for a negotiated gradual transition.  
 Phase four of the adjusted model would incorporate some tactical concessions of 
human rights in the context of a domestically negotiated transition. In order to see some 
significant improvements in civil and political rights, domestic elites (reformists, 
pragmatic conservatives) must be willing to allow hard-line conservatives to maintain 
financial benefits and control over some military forces (Revolutionary Guard) in return 
for a gradual power sharing agreement. This power sharing arrangement (as seen in 
Zimbabwe or Chile) would require hard liners to release control of the presidency and 
parliament (specifically who is allowed to run and hold office) and eventually control 
over the judiciary as well in order to start making progress towards the rule of law. 
 Phase four gradually shifts to phase five where more political power is being 
shifted to elected bodies and away from unelected bodies (Guardian Council, Supreme 
Leader). In the fifth phase human rights would have prescriptive status. We further see 
greater domestic NGOs pressure especially concerning Islam. Domestic NGOs arguing 
for a re-interpretation of Islam in a more human rights friendly manner can lead to 
                                                        
73 Tehran is particularly concerned with the rhetoric of regime change that was used during the George W. 
Bush Administration. Criticisms from western NGOs, while inconvenient do not pose the same threat as 
Washington does.  
74 While the United States does not control Israeli foreign policy, Washington can apply pressure to Tel 
Aviv to avoid threats to Tehran and especially a strike on Iranian territory. Towards the end of George W. 
Bush’s presidency, Israel sought permission to fly in Iraqi airspace for a mission over Iran. This request 
was denied and despite various hawkish statements from Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu, Israel has not 
engaged in provocative actions towards Tehran.  
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progress on human rights while continuing to work within an Islamic context. Thus 
efforts by Soroush and others who work within an Islamic framework to improve human 
rights protections in Iran are instructive. This is less threatening than a Western approach 
because it incorporates elements that are consistent with the culture and history of the 
people. 
 The last phase would incorporate rule consistent behavior- the institutionalization 
of human rights under new leaders. In order for this to occur you will need to see a 
gradual transition of power (perhaps similar to Pinochet in Chile). Iranians reformers and 
pragmatic conservatives will need to agree to guarantee the hard-liners that they will be 
protected financially and from judicial punishment in return for a gradual handover of 
power and then you will have the opening to make more progress on human rights. While 
this is occurring in the realm of civil and political rights progress can still be made on 
human rights on issues such as education or health care because they are not viewed as 
threatening as political rights.    
VI Applying the Adjusted Model: 
If we examine Iran in the context of the spiral model, on some basic human rights, 
Iran has moved through the first three phases. In the past, Iranian leaders have denied the 
applicability and the worth of international human rights. However, in more recent years, 
we have seen various Iranian leaders, including hard-line conservatives using the 
language of international human rights. This section shows that linguistic transition.   
The Discourse on Human Rights 
For Khomeini, international human rights treaties were inferior to Islamic law. 
(Khomeini had a general disregard for many aspects of international law. This was 
demonstrated by the violation of diplomatic immunity by the hostage crisis in 1979.) On 
February 19, 1978, Khomeini gave a speech in which he articulated the hypocrisy of the 
West and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
All the miseries that we have suffered, still suffer, and are about to suffer soon are 
caused by the heads of those countries that have signed the Declaration of Human 
Rights, but that at all times have denied man his freedom. Freedom of the 
individual is the most important part of the Declaration of Human Rights. 
Individual human beings must all be equal before the law, and they must be free. 
They must be free in their choice of residence and occupation. But we see the 
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Iranian nation, together with many other suffering at the hands of those states that 
have signed and ratified the Declaration.75 
 
Khomeini went on to add that “The Declaration of Human Rights exists only to deceive 
the nations; it is the opium of the masses.”76 At another time he asserted, “What they call 
human rights is nothing but a collection of corrupt rules worked out by Zionists to 
destroy all true religions.”77 
This hostility towards international human rights law was echoed by Supreme 
Leader Khamenei who said, “changing some absolute Islamic decrees to correspond to 
certain international conventions is quite wrong.”78 Thus some prominent leaders have 
denied the validity of international human rights law. However, the language of some 
political elites has evolved from a denial of the legitimacy of international human rights 
to a denial of wrongdoing. 
More and more we see Iranian leaders using the language of human rights in 
recognition of the Iranian public’s demand for human rights. For example, in his remarks 
on June 19, 2009 Supreme Leader Khamenei said that the Islamic Republic is a strong 
supporter of human rights especially the oppressed.79 Of course the notion that Iran is 
flag bearer for international human rights is fanciful especially in light of the harsh 
crackdown after the presidential elections in 2009. 
Other Iranian leaders have denied that their country systematically violates human 
rights. For example, Mohamad Javad Larijani who is on Iran’s human rights committee 
(a committee established by the supreme leader) had argued that stoning is not torture and 
hence not a violation of a person’s rights. The use of stoning as a punishment for adultery 
is neither “torture nor disproportionate punishment.”80 Further, some Iranians have 
suggested that much of the criticism from the United States and other Western countries 
                                                        
75 Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Iman Khomeini, translated and annotated by Hamid 
Algar, (Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press, 1981) page 213.  
76 Algar, page 214.  
77 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007), 35. Khamenei, 
while president expressed similar sentiments: “When we want to find out what is right and wrong, we do 
not go to the United Nations, we go to the Holy Koran. For us the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
is nothing but a collection of mumbo-jumbo by disciples of Satan.” 
78 Tehran Times, “Leader: No Conflict Between Women’s Social and Family Roles,” 7/5/07. 
79 His remarks from Friday Prayers can be found at http://www.leader.ir/langs/EN/index.php 
80 Tehran Times October 1, 2007, “West’s Criticism of Iran’s human rights record is politically motivated: 
IPM Director.  
 25 
is politically motivated. The head of the Judiciary, Ayatollah Shahroudi argued that “the 
international community uses human rights as a weapon against the Islamic world.”81   
While Iran has not complied a perfect record of protecting international human 
rights at home, they have voiced concerns about human rights abroad. One of the most 
pressing concerns for many in Iran (both political elites and Iranian citizens) is Palestine. 
For the last three decades, the Iranian government has raised concerns about the human 
rights of Palestinians. Many believe that Palestinians lack basic human rights including 
fundamental freedoms and political rights.   
 Khomeini often voiced concern for Palestinians. In February 1971 he urged 
Muslims to help liberate “the Islamic land of Palestine from the grasp of Zionism.”82 
After the Revolution he continued to argue for the plight of the Palestinians in a message 
to pilgrims in September 1979: 
Today the first qibla of the Muslims has fallen into the grasp of Israel, that 
cancerous growth in the Middle East. They are battering and slaughtering our dear 
Palestinian and Lebanese brothers with all their might.83 
 
The language of the concern voiced for the Palestinians has evolved over the 
years to incorporate aspects of international human rights. In the early moths of 2009 the 
president submitted an international war crimes bill to parliament. The bill seeks to 
prosecute individuals in any part of the world with crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. Specifically this includes denying a civilian population humanitarian assistance, 
attempts to exterminate a group of people, rape, as well as using toxic weapons.84 This 
bill is aimed specifically at Israel and was drafted in response to the war in the Gaza Strip 
in 2008. Although politically motivated it is important to note that Iran is using the tools 
and language of the international human rights community. This can also be used against 
Iran itself. 
Thus over the last thirty years we have seen changes in the language employed by 
various elites in Iran. Instead of denying the importance or validity of international 
human rights, some political leaders are simply denying that Iran is acting improperly. In 
other cases, elites are using the language of international human rights to criticize other 
                                                        
81 State Department Report 2/25/09 
82 Algar translation, 195 
83 Algar, 276 
84 Tehran Times, “Ahmadinejad submits International War Crimes Bill,” 2/23/09. www.tehrantimes.com. 
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countries. This suggests a change in the regime’s relationship to internationally 
recognized human rights. International human rights went from being a product of the 
West and hence easily rejected to the current status of accepting human rights as 
legitimate but claiming that the West manipulates the discussion of human rights or that 
the country’s human rights record is misunderstood. 
VII. Improving Human Rights 
 There have been relatively short periods in which there was less repression 
engineered by the regime. In the aftermath of Khomeini’s death in 1989, Ali Khamenei 
became the new Supreme Leader. The real power in Iranian politics however was held by 
President Rafsanjani. The Rafsanjani presidency saw some limited liberation in Iranian 
politics. After the reign of terror and after much of the opposition had been purged 
including the Tudeh party (communist party) there was some limited cultural openings 
and enhanced liberties. Universities that had been closed due to western influenced were 
reopened and Iranians with professional skills (doctors and engineers) who had gone into 
exile due to the revolutionary changes were encouraged to return home.85 Further 
indications of a small gradual opening on dissent could be found in the parliament. As 
speaker of the Majlis, Rafsanjani allowed feisty debates and criticism of the 
government.86 
Various dissidents and domestic NGOs have tried to improve the country’s 
protection of human rights. Some have done so from a religious reference point arguing 
that Iranians leaders have misinterpreted Islamic texts. Thus, if a more accurate 
understanding of the Qur’an and Sunnah were applied to laws, a more just and rights 
protective society could be realized in Iran. Efforts to strengthen human rights protections 
from within an Islamic framework have the greatest potential for success because these 
efforts use the cultural and religious tools of the society.87 (This corresponds to phase 5 in 
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the revised model- domestic pressure for a re-interpretation of Islam.) For example, some 
Islamic feminists or religiously oriented feminists in Iran have argued that women’s 
rights can be protected in an Islamic state if a proper reading of the Qur’an is 
undertaken.88 In this sense, Islamic feminists do not challenge the religious foundations 
of the political system. They are seeking to reform- not overturn- the present political 
system.89 When Shirin Ebadi, a prominent human rights lawyer won the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 2003 she specifically stressed the compatibility of Islam and internationally 
recognized human rights.90 
VIII. Implications for the Future 
 Given that there has been some progress made in areas such as education, should 
we expect to see further gains in the protections of human rights? The picture is 
somewhat mixed. The nuclear issue will hinder progress on human rights. The 
international community’s main focus is preventing, either through persuasion or 
sanctions, the Islamic Republic from becoming a nuclear power with the ability to build a 
nuclear weapon.  While Iran insists that it is developing a peaceful nuclear energy 
program, the rest of the world has not been convinced.  
 Although the nuclear issue is a hindrance to human rights, there are some other 
developments which offer hope for progress on human rights. To begin with political 
leaders in Iran from various political leanings have used the language of human rights. 
They are ‘talking the talk.’ One example of this was the international war crimes bill 
discussed earlier. Even if selectively applied this still suggests a use of the language of 
international human rights which is a large step from Khomeini’s rejection of human 
rights and a step towards the protection of human rights. In addition, when discussing the 
case of journalist Roxana Saberi, President Ahmadinejad’ Chief of Staff, Abdolreza 
Sheikholeslami wrote, “Take care that the defendants have all the legal freedoms and 
rights to defend themselves against the charges and none of their rights are violated.”91 
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This statement echoes the values of the rule of law. Furthermore, with President Obama 
now occupying the White House, there are less threats emanating from the Great Satan.  
 
IX. Conclusion 
 Michael Ignatieff has argued that the protection of human rights in authoritarian 
states comes about “when activists risk their lives and create a popular and indigenous 
demand for these rights, and when their activism receives consistent and forthright 
support from influential nations abroad.”92 This essay has argued that the process is more 
complicated than that. Many of the human rights violations committed by the government 
stem from two sources: a specific interpretation of Islam (as opposed to Islam itself) and 
real and perceived threats to the political elite. Limitations on political rights including 
freedom of expression occur to limit political opposition to the regime and especially the 
hard-line conservatives in power. Human rights violations that occur in the name of Islam 
(requiring women to wear a veil or punishing an individual accused of adultery by 
stoning) may offer more hope for progress. Since ijtihad (interpretation of religious 
texts/independent reasoning) allows for the reexamination of some Islamic doctrines and 
ideas, this may provide an avenue for improving the human rights’ record in Iran. Article 
2 of the constitution specifically allows for this: 
 The exalted dignity and value of man, and his freedom coupled with 
 responsibility before God; in which equity, justice, political, economic, social, 
 and cultural independence, and national solidarity are secured by recourse to:1. 
 continuous ijtihad of the fuqaha’ possessing necessary qualifications, exercised on 
 the basis of the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Ma’sumum, upon all of whom be 
 peace.  
 
But we should also note the limitation to using Islam to promote human rights. Islam will 
only go so far when the political elites feel they are threatened.  
Iran’s political system is far from a mature, liberal democracy which guarantees 
all of its citizens basic internationally recognized human rights. Various human rights 
including freedom of speech, press, assembly, the right to a fair trial, due process and 
bodily integrity are often violated due to perceived threats to those in power. However we 
have also seen some limited progress on second generation rights such as improved 
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health care and access to basic needs such as water. Since real and perceived threats 
account for some of the human rights violations in Iran, removing threats will be essential 
to improving human rights protection in the future. This is why threat reduction is part of 
the adjusted spiral model. While the spiral model alerts us to important aspects of 
improvement in human rights especially the socialization of norms concerning 
international human rights, it requires some adjustment to be applicable to a country such 
as Iran which has dealt with sanctions and international pressure for over three decades.  
Given some of the limited progress on second generation rights and the fact that 
political elites are using the language of international human rights there is some basis for 
hope for the future. When coupled with the fact that Iran has generally (2009 was an 
exception) held regular elections in which Iranian citizens are able to vote for a narrow 
list of candidates and the fact that theocracy that Khomeini created is far more inclusive 
than many of the political systems found in the Middle East or under the Pahlavi regime 
there is some basis for improved human rights protection in the future. The spiral model 
with some modifications offers a blueprint (although not a teleological guarantee) for 
greater protection of human rights in the future. While the road is not guaranteed, the less 
threatened the regime feels the greater chance there is for improved human rights 
protections in Iran. 
 
 
